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1 **IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO**

Court of Appeals of New Mexico  
Filed 1/10/2023 11:22 AM

2 **21ST MORTGAGE CORPORATION,**

3 Plaintiff-Appellee,

4 v.

5 **RAYMOND R. ROMERO,**

6 Defendant-Appellant,

7 and

8 **DAWN M. ROMERO and NEW MEXICO**

9 **DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE**

10 **SOLUTIONS,**

11 Defendants.

12 **APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TAOS COUNTY**

13 **Emilio J. Chavez, District Court Judge**

14 Davis Miles McGuire Gardner, PLLC

15 Grace E. Jennings

16 Albuquerque, NM

17 for Appellee

18 Raymond R. Romero

19 Peñasco, NM

20 Pro Se Appellant



Mark Reynolds

**No. A-1-CA-40567**

1 **MEMORANDUM OPINION**

2 **IVES, Judge.**

3 {1} In this foreclosure action, Defendant appealed following the issuance of a  
4 corrected writ of replevin and the denial of a motion for reconsideration. We  
5 previously issued a notice of proposed summary disposition in which we proposed  
6 to affirm. Defendant has filed a memorandum in opposition. After due consideration,  
7 we remain unpersuaded by the assertions of error. We therefore affirm.

8 {2} Because we previously set forth the relevant background information, we will  
9 avoid undue reiteration here, and focus instead on the substantive aspects of the  
10 memorandum in opposition.

11 {3} Defendant continues to assert that the issuance of the corrected writ of  
12 replevin was improper. [Unnumbered MIO 1-2] However, he does not renew his  
13 original position, that discrepancies in the property description should be regarded  
14 as fatal deficiencies. We therefore adhere to our initial assessment, [CN 6-7] and  
15 reject that argument. Instead, Defendant now contends that the delay between the  
16 entry of the judgment in December 2019 and the issuance, service, and execution of  
17 the corrected writ of replevin in 2022 was prohibitive. [Unnumbered MIO 1-2]  
18 Because we find no indication that Defendant raised this specific argument below,  
19 we are hesitant to address it on appeal. *See Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Beagles*  
20 *Chrysler-Plymouth*, 1971-NMSC-112, ¶ 4, 83 N.M. 272, 491 P.2d 160 (observing

1 in a debt collection action entailing replevin of goods that “matter[s] not brought to  
2 the attention of the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal”).  
3 Nevertheless, we note that the authority upon which Defendant relies as support for  
4 his position, NMSA 1978, § 42-8-5(D) (1975), pertains to the contents of affidavits  
5 submitted in support of statutory replevin actions. This is a mortgage foreclosure  
6 action. [RP 1-8] Although the judgment specified that a writ of replevin would be  
7 deemed to have been issued and received upon confirmation of the special master’s  
8 sale, [RP 74] that did not transform the foreclosure proceedings into a statutory  
9 replevin action. *Cf. Encino State Bank v. Tenorio*, 1922-NMSC-026, ¶¶ 26-29, 28  
10 N.M. 65, 206 P. 698 (commenting on the “[i]rregularities and procedural anomalies”  
11 attending an action that was commenced upon the filing of both a complaint in  
12 foreclosure and an affidavit in the statutory form provided for replevin actions;  
13 explaining that such a combination appeared to be unprecedented and improper; and  
14 ultimately declining to treat the proceeding as a foreclosure action, where  
15 foreclosure procedures were not satisfied, but rather the requested writ of replevin  
16 had been issued and the only real benefit obtained was the recovery of the property  
17 under the replevin writ). In any event, to the extent that the judgment contemplated  
18 the constructive issuance of a writ of replevin to ensure transfer possession following  
19 sale of the mortgaged property, [RP 74] that effectively transpired within the one-  
20 year period contemplated by Section 42-8-5(D). [RP 68, 91, 96]

1 {4} In light of Defendant’s subsequent failure to vacate the property as ordered,  
2 [RP 74] Plaintiff was compelled to undertake additional efforts to effectuate its  
3 entitlement to possession. We remain unpersuaded that those efforts were  
4 impermissibly delayed. *See* NMSA 1978, § 39-1-20 (1971) (authorizing execution  
5 on a judgment any time “within seven years after rendition or revival of the  
6 judgment”); *Crowell v. Kopp*, 1919-NMSC-065, ¶ 11, 26 N.M. 146, 189 P. 652  
7 (observing that there is no statute of limitations in this jurisdiction that is specifically  
8 applicable to the enforcement of decrees of foreclosure), *overruling recognized by*,  
9 *Abarca v. Henry L. Hanson, Inc.*, 1987-NMCA-068, ¶ 9, 106 N.M. 25, 738 P.2d 519  
10 (noting that our New Mexico Supreme Court has overruled *Crowell* on other  
11 grounds). Plaintiff’s pursuit of its rights in 2022, [RP 105] following the termination  
12 of the stay of consumer debt collection efforts during the coronavirus pandemic,  
13 does not render the issuance of the new and corrected writ improper, or the execution  
14 thereof untimely. *See* Supreme Court Order No. 20-8500-021 (effective June 5,  
15 2020) (staying the issuance of writs of execution as they pertain to consumer debt  
16 collection cases); Supreme Court Order No. 21-8500-018 (issued August 2, 2021)  
17 (lifting the aforementioned stay in stages, and authorizing judgment creditors to file  
18 new applications for writs); *First Nat’l Bank of Santa Fe v. Sw. Yacht & Marine*  
19 *Supply Corp.*, 1984-NMSC-075, ¶¶ 7-8, 101 N.M. 431, 684 P.2d 517 (holding that  
20 corrections in replevin actions relate back).

1 {5} Defendant also renews his effort to challenge the district court’s confirmation  
2 of the special master’s sale. [Unnumbered MIO 2] However, Defendant makes no  
3 attempt to address the jurisdictional concerns associated with his failure to pursue a  
4 timely appeal relative to the sale. Accordingly, for the reasons previously described  
5 in the notice of proposed summary disposition, [CN 3-5] we conclude that this matter  
6 is foreclosed.

7 {6} Third and finally, Defendant seeks leave to amend the docketing statement to  
8 advance a challenge based upon an alleged “conflict of interest between the [s]pecial  
9 [m]aster and [c]ounsel for Plaintiff.” [Unnumbered DS 3] However, as previously  
10 stated, issues relative to the special master’s sale of the subject property and the  
11 ensuing confirmation of that sale are not properly before us at this juncture. We  
12 therefore deny the motion to amend, on grounds that the issue is not viable. *See, e.g.,*  
13 *State v. Ibarra*, 1993-NMCA-040, ¶ 13, 116 N.M. 486, 864 P.2d 302 (“[S]ince the  
14 issue [the d]efendant seeks to add to his docketing statement is not viable, the motion  
15 to amend is denied.”).

16 {7} Accordingly, for the reasons stated in our notice of proposed disposition and  
17 herein, we affirm.


1 {8} IT IS SO ORDERED.

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ZACHARY A. IVES, Judge

4 WE CONCUR:

5   
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6 JENNIFER L. ATTREP, Judge

7   
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8 JACQUELINE R. MEDINA, Judge